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THE DISCHARGE OF CERCLA LIABILITY IN
BANKRUPTCY AFTER ATLANTIC RESEARCH
Robert P. Frank*
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 11, 2007, in United States v. Atlantic Research
Corporation,I the United States Supreme Court unanimously held
that "the plain terms of § 107(a)(4)(B)" of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
("CERCLA") 2, as amended, allow potentially responsible parties
("PRPs") under CERCLA to recover costs from other PRPs incurred
in response to the release or threat of release to the environment of
hazardous substances.3 Atlantic Research was not a bankruptcy case.
It did not involve a debtor in bankruptcy or a company reorganized
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Atlantic Research was an
environmental case: it interpreted a section of CERCLA, and
resolved a controversy that had troubled federal courts since
CERCLA's inception.4 Although the holding in Atlantic Research
raises, and may- or may not- resolve, issues arguably unique to
* Robert P. Frank is a 1986 graduate of Boston College Law School and a
partner in the Philadelphia office of Reed Smith LLP, where he practices
environmental and energy law.
1. 551 U.S. 128 (2007).
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006).
3. The term "hazardous substance" is specifically defined by CERCLA and
encompasses a wide variety of substances, including but not limited to hazardous
waste. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (2006).
4. Atl. Research, 551 U.S. 128; see, e.g., In re Jensen, 995 F.2d 925, 928 (9th
Cir. 1993); In re Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 974 F.2d 775, 779 (7th
Cir. 1992); In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Nat'l
Gypsum, 139 B.R. 397, 404 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992).
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CERCLA,5 the greatest impact of Atlantic Research may ultimately
be felt in the field of bankruptcy law, not environmental law. After
Atlantic Research, it is now unknown whether or not CERCLA
liability for a site can be discharged under the Bankruptcy Code.
II. THE TENSION BETWEEN CERCLA AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
More than a decade before the Supreme Court's decision in
Atlantic Research, lower courts recognized "that the Bankruptcy
Code and CERCLA point toward competing objectives," 6 and that
the two statutes "are in tension in significant respects." 7 Courts
perceived this tension as inherent in the aims of the two statutes:
"[t]he conflict begins at a basic level, since the goal of CERCLA -
cleaning up toxic waste sites promptly and holding liable those
responsible for the pollution- is at odds with the premise of
bankruptcy, which is to allow debtors a fresh start by freeing them of
liability."'
The Supreme Court recognized "that a central purpose of the
[Bankruptcy] Code is to provide a procedure" by which "'honest but
unfortunate"' debtors can "reorder their affairs, make peace with their
creditors, and enjoy 'a new opportunity in life with a clear field for
future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-
existing debt."' 9 Lower courts have recognized this aim as a goal of
5. 551 U.S. 128. CERCLA seeks to encourage PRPs to settle with the United
States by protecting PRPs which settle the government's CERCLA claims against
them from liability "for claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the
settlement." 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (2006). Because Atlantic Research held that
PRPs who remediate contaminated sites may be able to recover costs incurred for
such remediation using § 107(a)(4)(B), the decision led to renewed concern that
PRPs voluntarily remediating a contaminated site could use § 107(a)(4)(B) to
circumvent the bar against contribution claims. See, e.g., Joanna M. Fuller, The
Sanctity of Settlement: Stopping CERCLA's Volunteer Remediators from
Sidestepping the Settlement Bar, 34 COLuM. J. ENVTL. L. 219 (2009).
6. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1002.
7. See Nat'l Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 404; see also Jensen, 995 F.2d at 928 (noting
conflict between CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code); Chi., Milwaukee, 974 F.2d
at 779.
8. In re Combustion Equip. Assoc., 838 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1988).
9. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (quoting in part Local Loan Co.
v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)).
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corporate reorganizations under the Bankruptcy Code which involve
CERCLA liabilities.' 0
While bankruptcy proceedings propose to limit and discharge
liability, § 107(a) serves the opposite purpose and "lists four broad
categories of persons as PRPs, by definition liable to other persons
for various costs. ... " As the United States noted in its petition for
certiorari in Atlantic Research:
107(a) of CERCLA imposes liability for cleanup costs on
four categories of "[c]overed persons -typically known as
potentially responsible parties (PRPs)- associated with the
release or threatened release of hazardous substances. . . .
PRPs are defined as (1) owners and operators of facilities at
which hazardous substances are located; (2) past owners
and operators of such facilities at the time that disposal of
hazardous substances occurred; (3) persons who arranged
for disposal or treatment of hazardous substances; and (4)
certain transporters of hazardous substances.12
As the description of the four categories of PRPs demonstrates, the
universe of PRPs is not limited to current and former owners or
tenants of contaminated sites. Rather, CERCLA "defines PRPs so
broadly as to sweep in virtually all persons likely to incur cleanup
costs."1 3 Courts applying CERCLA often identify a PRP as the
generator of any hazardous substances that were disposed of or
manufactured at a contaminated site. 14 However, the breadth of §
107(a) is not limited to those who generate, transport, or dispose of
hazardous substances but can reach "even parties not responsible for
contamination."' 5 PRPs can be liable for cleanup costs to the
10. See, e.g., Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1002 (stating that "[t]he Code aims to
provide reorganized debtors with a fresh start, an objective made more feasible by
maximizing the scope of a discharge."); United States v. Union Scrap Iron &
Metal, 123 B.R. 831, 835 (D. Minn. 1990).
11. United States v. AtI. Research, 551 U.S. 128, 134 n.2 (2007).
12. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Atl. Research, 551 U.S. 128 (No. 06-562)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (2006)).
13. Atl. Research, 551 U.S. at 129.
14. See Kyle E. McSlarrow, David E. Jones & Eric J. Murdock, A Decade of
Superfund Litigation: CERCLA Case Law From 1981-1991, in SUPERFUND
DESKBOOK 510 (Envtl. L. Inst., 1992).
15. Atl. Research, 551 U.S. at 136.
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government, to other PRPs, and to private persons who are not
PRPs.' 6
Before Atlantic Research, the Supreme Court acknowledged the
tension between CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code, and lower
courts had discerned in that acknowledgment a direction to reconcile
if possible the conflicting objectives of the two statutes.' 7 In Atlantic
Research, the Court refrained from any mention of bankruptcy.18
Whereas before, reconciliation may have been possible, 19 the tension
between the two statutes has now grown, so much so that in certain
cases it may no longer be an option.
To see the tension between the two statutes, consider how
bankruptcy law identifies which claims may be discharged. In
corporate reorganizations under Chapter 11 of the Code, "the
confirmation of a plan" of reorganization "discharges the debtor from
any debt that arose before the date of such confirmation."20
Similarly, in individual bankruptcies under Chapter 7, with certain
limited exceptions that do not expressly include CERCLA liability,21
an individual may be discharged "from all debts that arose before the
16. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4)(A)-(B), 9613(f)(1) (2006).
17. In re Jensen, 995 F.2d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 1993). Jensen notes the conflict
between CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code and observes that, despite these
tensions, "the Supreme Court has indicated more than once that, if possible, these
two conflicting objectives should be reconciled." Id. (citing Erman v. Lox Equip.
Co., 142 B.R. 905, 907 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (internal citations omitted).
18. The Court was nevertheless aware of the implications its decision in Atlantic
Research could have on
bankruptcy. On behalf of Reading Company, a corporation formed in 1833,
operated as a railroad until the late
1970s, and discharged from a reorganization in bankruptcy on January 1, 1981,
three weeks after CERCLA was
enacted, this author filed an amicus brief in Atlantic Research which discussed
these implications and alerted the
Court to how the tension between bankruptcy and environmental law had
manifested itself in In re Reading Co., 115 F.3d 1111 (3d Cir. 1997). See Brief for
Reading Co. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Atil. Research, 551 U.S. 128
(No. 06-562).
19. See In re Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 974 F.2d 775 (7th Cir.
1992); In re Chateugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d Cir. 1991) (discussing the
potential to reconcile the underlying policy goals of Bankruptcy and CERCLA).
20. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A) (2006) (emphasis added).




date of the order of relief."22 After a bankruptcy, a court deciding
whether or not CERCLA liabilities were discharged by a bankruptcy
must therefore first decide if those liabilities existed in any form
during the bankruptcy to be discharged.23 As one bankruptcy court
noted, "[b]ecause bankruptcy discharges liability only for claims that
arose before the bankruptcy petition was filed, the focus of the
[c]ourt's inquiry must be on when the CERCLA obligations arose., 24
The time at which "liability on a claim" - i.e., a "debt" under the
Bankruptcy Code - arises is therefore critical when determining
whether a claim can be discharged in bankruptcy. 25 In considering the
tension between CERCLA and bankruptcy, the Seventh Circuit
found: "[a] question at the heart of this tension: at what point does a
party have a CERCLA claim for purposes of bankruptcy so that the
failure to raise the claim before bankruptcy bar dates forever bars the
claim from being brought against the successors to a reorganized
company?" 26
Before Atlantic Research, courts answered this question in three
different ways.27 Under the test most favorable to the CERCLA
claimant, articulated by the United States District Court for the
Western District of Tennessee in United States v. Union Scrap Iron &
Metal,28 a "claim exists only when the pre-bankruptcy relationship
between the debtor and third party contained all the elements
necessary to give rise to a legal obligation under [CERCLA]." 29 In
Union Scrap, the United States Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") was the CERCLA claimant seeking to recover costs from a
22. Id. § 727(b) (emphasis added).
23. See id By the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code, debts must exist,
otherwise they could not be discharged.
24. In re Chateaugay Corp., 112 B.R. 513, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd 944 F.2d
997 (2d Cir. 1991).
25. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(5), (12) (2006) (defining "claim" and "debt").
26. In re Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 974 F.2d 775, 779 (7th Cir.
1992).
27. For a review of these three tests: Compare In re Hassanally, 208 B.R. 46,
50-54 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997), with Signature Combs, Inc. v. United States, 253 F.
Supp. 2d 1028, 1033-38 (W.D. Tenn. 2003), Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger & Michael
G. Hillinger, Environmental Affairs in Bankruptcy: 2004, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 331, 379-89 (2004), and Philippe J. Kahn, Bankruptcy Versus Environmental
Protection: Discharging Future CERCLA Liability in Chapter 11, 14 CARDozo L.
REV. 1999, 2023-32 (1993).
28. United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. 831 (D. Minn. 1990).
29. Id. at 835.
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reorganized company years after its bankruptcy had ended. 30 The
court found that "[b]ecause the EPA had incurred no response costs
at the time of. . . confirmation, the EPA "could have no claim in the
bankruptcy proceedings-"there was no legal obligation under
CERCLA." 3 1  Union Scrap renders the incurrence of costs in
response to the release, or threat of release, of a hazardous substance
the key to determining whether a CERCLA claim dischargeable in
bankruptcy exists. However, this test has been criticized because it
"arguably gives the creditor too much control over the accrual of its
claim."32
Under a second test, the identification and discharge of a CERCLA
claim in bankruptcy depends on when the release or threat of release,
of hazardous substances first occurred.33 This test is sometimes
referred to as the "conduct" test because it deems CERCLA claims to
have arisen at the point when the conduct which gave rise to the
CERCLA claim first occurred.34 The "conduct" test stands at the
opposite extreme of Union Scrap because it deems a dischargeable
CERCLA claim to have arisen without the decision of the putative
CERCLA claimant to incur any costs in response to the release and
without knowledge of the release.3 5 The "conduct" test can thereby
set a date for the emergence of a CERCLA claim in a bankruptcy
which is so early that at least one federal appellate court has rejected
30. Id. at 834.
31. Id. at 836.
32. In re Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 974 F.2d 775, 786 (7th Cir.
1992). As the Seventh Circuit noted, the Union Scrap court did not apply the same
rule in a later case "involving a creditor who was not aware of the debtor's
relationship to a known hazardous site until after the close of bankruptcy...." Id. at
785 (citing Sylvester Bros. v. Burlington N. R.R., 133 B.R. 648, 653 (D. Minn.
1991)). In Sylvester Bros., as the Seventh Circuit noted, it was not the CERCLA
claimant's lack of incurred response costs at the time of the reorganization, but the
claimant's lack of knowledge that it had a CERCLA claim to assert, that formed the
rationale for holding that the CERCLA claim had not been discharged in the
bankruptcy. Chi., Milwaukee 974 F.2d at 785-86 (citing Sylvester Bros., 133 B.R.
at 653).
33. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1005 (2d Cir. 1991).
34. See In re Hassanally 208 B.R. 46, 51 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997); Hillinger &
Hillinger, supra note 26, at 383; Kahn, supra note 26, at 2023-25.




it as incompatible with CERCLA's goal of cleaning up the
environment. 36
The third test, arguably a middle ground between the extremes of
Union Scrap and Chateaugay, is popularly referred to as the "fair
contemplation" test 37 because it dates the dischargeable CERCLA
claim to the moment when the parties could be deemed to "fairly"
contemplate the existence and incurrence of costs in response to
environmental contamination. 38 This test views CERCLA claims as
dischargeable in bankruptcy "when a potential CERCLA claimant
can tie the bankruptcy debtor to a known release of a hazardous
substance which the potential claimant knows will lead to CERCLA
response costs." 39
III. THE GREATER COMPLEXITY OF BANKRUPTCY AFTER ATLANTIC
RESEARCH
Allowing PRPs to recover costs using § 107(a)(4)(B) strains the
analytical framework of the "conduct" and "fair contemplation" tests,
and arguably exposes the inability of each test to recognize every
CERCLA claim conceivable under § 107(a)(4)(B) and to decide
whether the claim existed during a reorganization to be discharged by
the bankruptcy. Because certain § 107(a)(4)(B) claims cannot be
detected by either test, it will become increasingly difficult for a
debtor reorganizing in bankruptcy to emerge from reorganization and
plan for a future without CERCLA liability for pre-bankruptcy acts or
omissions.
36. See In re Jensen, 995 F.2d 925, 930-31 (9th Cir. 1993). The Ninth Circuit
rejected the "conduct" test used by the
Second Circuit in Chateaugay, overturning the adoption of that test by the
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit in In re Jensen because that test
encompasses costs 'that could not 'fairly' have been contemplated by the EPA"'
during the reorganization. Jensen, 995 F.2d at 930-31 (citing In re Nat'l Gypsum,
139 B.R. 397, 408 (N.D. Tex 1992)).
37. See, e.g., Alan N. Resnick, Mass Torts: Bankruptcy as a Vehicle for
Resolving Enterprise-Threatening Mass Tort Liability, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 2045,
2072 (2000) (noting that "[s]everal courts have adopted the 'fair contemplation
test' to determine when a future claim arises.").
38. Nat'l Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 409.
39. In re Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 974 F.2d 775, 786 (7th Cir.
1992). See Nat'l Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 407-08 (stating a CERCLA claim arises
when "fair contemplation of future costs based on pre-petition conduct can occur at
any particular site by the parties."); see also Jensen, 995 F.2d at 930.
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PRPs continuously come into existence as they generate, transport,
release, and dispose of substances hazardous under CERCLA at a
contaminated site, own such contaminated sites, or lease them. Years
before emerging from reorganization, a reorganized company may
cease to generate waste found at a contaminated site, or to transport
waste to a site, but that site may remain open and accept waste for
years after the reorganization ends. 40 Consider too that CERCLA
sites can involve dozens or even hundreds of PRPs.41 Given these
possibilities, a generator or transporter, for example, who was not a
PRP during a bankruptcy can become one post-bankruptcy. The
number of PRPs can multiply, and each PRP may have a
§ 107(a)(4)(B) claim against other PRPs to recover costs.
When PRPs were limited to claims for contribution under
CERCLA, the issues created by a multitude of PRPs arising at
various times - before, during, and after a bankruptcy reorganization
- could be avoided.42 As long as they were only contribution claims,
the CERCLA claims of various PRPs seeking to recover after
bankruptcy from a reorganized company could all be decided by
looking to see if the reorganized company and the PRPs asserting
CERCLA claims against it were jointly liable to the government. 43 In
such instances, if the court found that no joint liability could exist
40. See In re Reading Company, 115 F.3d 1111, 1115-16 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting
that operations at the site began in 1941 but did not stop until 1985, more than four
years after Reading Company emerged from bankruptcy on January 1, 1981); see
also In re Reading Company, 900 F. Supp. 738, 741-42 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (noting
chronology of waste shipments and bankruptcy).
41. The site at the center of Reading, for example, involved more than 600
PRPs, only thirty-six of which the United States ordered and later sued. 115 F.3d
at 1116. Such a large number of PRPs is not unique. See Akzo Coatings, Inc. v.
Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 762 (7th Cir. 1994) (involving a site where "more than
200 firms generated hazardous wastes" and the EPA unilaterally ordered
approximately twenty-one PRPs to conduct emergency cleanup).
42. Before Atlantic Research, several appellate courts limited PRP contribution
claims. See Cooper Indus. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 169 (2004) (citing
cases decided in the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Ninth,
Tenth and Eleven Circuit Courts of Appeal which barred PRPs from pursuing a
CERCLA § 107(a) action against
other PRPs for joint and several liability and limited them to claims for contribution
under CERCLA § 113(f)(1)).
43. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1124 (adopting the "same traditional sense of




because the bankruptcy had discharged the reorganized company's
liability to the government, the post-bankruptcy CERCLA claimants,
because they were limited to a claim for contribution sustainable only
44if joint liability existed, lost all of their CERCLA claims. When a
court limited its analysis in this way, the ability of PRPs to multiply
and come into existence at anytime neither reduced nor precluded the
possibility of using a discharge in a bankruptcy reorganization to
resolve all of a debtor's CERCLA liability for a particular site.45
Under § 107(a)(4)(B), however, the analysis cannot be limited in
this way. "A private party may recover under § 107(a) without any
establishment of liability to a third party."4 6 Thus, the Supreme Court
stressed that the recovery of costs under § 107(a)(4)(B) is "distinct
from contribution" and refused the invitation of the United StateS47 to
use "the word 'contribution' as if it were synonymous with any
apportionment of expenses among PRPs." 48 Recovery under 107(a),
in short, does not depend in any way on the plaintiff establishing that
it and the defendant are both jointly liable to a third party which may
or may not be litigating-or have any sort of claim-against either
the plaintiff or the defendant. As the need for common liability to a
third party recedes, the multitude of issues presented by a multitude
of PRPs comes to the forefront.
The express inclusion of contingent claims within the Bankruptcy
Code's definition of "claim" at 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)49 might initially
appear to preclude -any question of post-bankruptcy exposure to
44. The Third Circuit used this reasoning ten years before Atlantic Research in
Reading. In Reading, the Third Circuit found the post-bankruptcy CERCLA claims
of PRPs against Reading Company, a reorganized company, were limited to claims
for contribution and held that those CERCLA claims failed "as a matter of law"
because the CERCLA liability of Reading Company to the United States for the
site in question had been discharged by Reading's bankruptcy. Reading, 115 F.3d
at 1123.
45. Id. at 1116-23 (noting that the reorganized company was one of over 600
PRPs at the site in question and affirming the ruling of the lower court that the
contribution claims of these PRPs failed "as a
matter of law" without proceeding to consider the timing of when those claims
came into existence).
46. United States v. Atl. Research, 551 U.S. 128, 139 (2007).
47. Reply Brief for the United States at 11 n.6, Atl. Research, 551 U.S. 128 (No.
06-562).
48. Atl. Research, 551 U.S. at 138-39.
49. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2006) (listing contingent claim as one of the
definitions of "claim").
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liability under § 107(a)(4)(B) for operations ending before a
bankruptcy ends; but this conclusion is not so simple. A §
107(a)(4)(B) claim asserted by a PRP post-bankruptcy can be
classified as a discharged contingent claim only if a relationship
existed between the private CERCLA claimant and the debtor during
the bankruptcy.50
The preexisting relationship between debtor and claimant during
bankruptcy led the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in Chateaugay to classify CERCLA claims held by the EPA
as "'contingent,' rather than as . .. outside the Code's definition of
'claim."' 5 1 The Chateaugay court noted that even though the EPA did
"not yet know the full extent of the hazardous waste removal costs
that it may one day incur and seek to impose upon" the debtor, and
might:
not yet even know the location of all the sites at which such
wastes may yet be found. . . [t]he relationship between the
environmental regulating agencies and those subject to
regulation provides sufficient 'contemplation' of
contingencies to bring most ultimately maturing payment
obligations based on pre-petition conduct within the
definition of 'claims.52
50. A contingent claim concerning a future injury is not found to exist under
bankruptcy law unless and until the private claimant who would suffer discharge of
the claim is first found to have some sort of relationship to or knowledge of the
debtor while the debtor was in bankruptcy. See In re Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul &
Pac. R.R., 974 F.2d 775, 782 (7th Cir. 1992) (CERCLA claim in § 77 railroad
reorganization); In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1003-06 (2d Cir. 1991)
(CERCLA claims in Ch. 11 reorganization); In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 944 F.2d
164, 167-68 (3d Cir. 1991) (refusing to find CERCLA liability, asserted after a
completed § 77 reorganization, was discharged in 1979 during reorganization as a
contingent claim because relationship necessary to sustain a contingent claim did
not come into existence until CERCLA's enactment in 1980); Schweitzer v.
Consol. Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 943 (3d Cir. 1985) (tort claim in § 77 railroad
reorganization); see also 2-101 A. N. Resnick & H. J. Sommer, Collier on
Bankruptcy 1101.5[l] (15th ed. rev. 2009).




The claimant and the debtor knew each other: EPA was "acutely
aware" of the debtor "and vice versa." 52
Between PRPs in a § 107(a)(4)(B) action, however, there is no
relationship remotely similar to that which exists between the
government and the regulated debtor-PRP. A PRP who generates
hazardous waste and sends it to a landfill which later becomes subject
to CERCLA, and a PRP who generates hazardous waste and uses the
same landfill, may each know the landfill's owner or operator. But
these generator-PRPs have no reason to know or learn the identity of
the other until someone-perhaps the government under §
107(a)(4)(A) or a PRP under § 107(a)(4)(B)-incurs costs in response
to contamination and seeks to recover them via a § 107(a) claim. As a
result, the post-bankruptcy § 107(a)(4)(B) claims of generator-PRPs
against each other may not be treated as contingent claims to be
discharged in bankruptcy.53 For this reason, after Atlantic Research,
neither of the legal tests articulated in Chateaugay and Chicago,
Milwaukee offer a way to view all § 107(a)(4)(B) claims for a
particular site as discharged contingent claims under the Bankruptcy
Code.
Of the three tests used before Atlantic Research, only the Union
Scrap test appears to survive Atlantic Research. The Union Scrap test
was developed and applied to a site where EPA did not know of the
debtor's link to the contaminated site in question.54 The reasoning in
Union Scrap, however, does not foreclose post-bankruptcy assertions
of CERCLA liability by private PRPs.5 5  Instead, it enables that
52. Id.
53. See id. The Second Circuit in Chateaugay discussed how broad the
contingencies of a contingent claim could be and noted that "[d]efining claims to
include any ultimate right to payment arising from pre-petition conduct by the
debtor [" is] "an interpretation of 'claim"' [which] "yields questionable results."
Id. at 1003. Chateaugay approvingly cites Third and Fifth Circuit decisions,
reached outside of the environmental context, in which dischargeable claims were
found not to exist for the purposes of a bankruptcy in circumstances where the
injured victims had no contact with the tortfeasor. Id. at 1003 (citing Schweitzer,
758 F.2d at 943 (asbestos claims of railroad workers)); In re Mooney Aircraft, Inc.,
730 F.2d 367, 375 n.6 (5th Cir. 1984) (victims of post-bankruptcy airplane
accident). The use of CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B) raises these same questions in the
context of CERCLA.
54. United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. 831, 834 (D. Minn.
1990).
55. Id. at 838.
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assertion. In cases where the claimant has not incurred response
costs until after bankruptcy has ended, Union Scrap places the
CERCLA claim outside the scope of a bankruptcy discharge simply
by identifying a dischargeable CERCLA claim with the incurrence of
costs. Under the holding of Union Scrap, the § 107 claim of a private
PRP would not exist until that PRP first incurred a cost it later tried to
recover under § 107.56 If the PRP asserting § 107(a)(4)(B) liability
first incurred costs after confirmation of a plan of reorganization or
discharge of an individual, that claimant "could have no claim in the
bankruptcy proceedings" that would have been discharged. This
outcome may occur even if the private claimant, as EPA did in Union
Scrap, knew of the bankruptcy.s
It appears, therefore, that none of the three tests can prevent a
PRP's post-bankruptcy assertion of a § 107(a)(4)(B) claim from
circumventing a bankruptcy discharge. Atlantic Research does not,
however, make circumvention possible because it makes §
107(a)(4)(B) available to a PRP which might, by refusing to spend
money, delay the birth of a § 107(a)(B) claim dischargeable under
Union Scrap. In cases where the PRPs asserting § 107(a)(B) claims
post-bankruptcy could be found to have known of contamination of
the site in question during the bankruptcy and could have linked the
reorganized company to the site, the post-bankruptcy § 107(a)(4)(B)
claim might still be found to have been discharged by a court
employing the "fair contemplation" test of National Gypsum or
Chicago Milwaukee.
But Atlantic Research may nevertheless have made the tests of
Chateaugay, National Gypsum and Chicago Milwaukee inherently
unworkable. Consider the continued use of the "fair contemplation"
test. By examining if a PRP asserting a § 107(a)(4)(B) claim against a
reorganized company after reorganization could have "fairly
contemplated" incurring response costs during the reorganization
process, the "fair contemplation" test assumes that the PRP existed
during the bankruptcy. 59 Juxtapose this consideration against the
following exchange between Chief Justice Roberts and counsel for
Atlantic Research during oral arguments before the Supreme Court:
56. Id. (finding that cost must be incurred before suit for recovery was brought).
58 Id. at 836.
58. See id. at 833-34.




CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You could set up a company
that cleans these sites, right, and go traveling around the
country and clean them up and then send people a bill and
cite your reading of § 107[(4)(B)], right?
MR. ARMSTRONG: § 107(a)(4)(B) would include both
PRPs and what we might call non-PRPs. I believe that one
of the amicus parties studies 364 cases between the years of
1995 and 2000 and there was one case out of that 364 that
involved precisely your hypothetical, Your Honor.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, if we rule in your
favor presumably there will be a lot more, right?60
It is beyond the scope of this article to consider whether the
number of cleanups voluntarily initiated by private parties increased
after Atlantic Research once § 107(a)(4)(B) became available to
private parties as a way to recover cleanup costs. What merits
scrutiny here is the Chief Justice's premise that someone "could set
up a company" which cleans up a site and then use § 107(a)(4)(B) to
recover its costs. Atlantic Research appears to support the use of §
107(a)(4)(B) in this way. In summarizing its detailed analysis of the
relationship of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of § 107, the Supreme
Court unequivocally found the cause of action available under §
107(a)(4)(B) to be available to any private party: "[a]tlantic Research
believes that subparagraph (B) provides a cause of action to anyone
except the United States, a State, or an Indian tribe - the persons
listed in subparagraph (A). We agree with Atlantic Research." 61
Atlantic Research thereby recognizes that a § 107(a)(4)(B) cause of
action is available to any private person who voluntarily and
unilaterally, without a settlement agreement or court judgment, incurs
costs recoverable under CERCLA in response to a release of a
hazardous substance to the environment. 62 After Atlantic Research,
if a § 107(a)(4)(B) claim is asserted after a reorganization ends by a
company formed to solely clean up a site and recover the cost of that
cleanup from all PRPs, it remains to be seen whether the "fair
60. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, United States v. Atl. Research, 551 U.S.
128 (2007) (No. 06-562) (statements of Chief Justice John Roberts and Owen T.
Armstrong, Jr., counsel to Atlantic Research Corporation).
61. Atl. Research, 551 U.S. at 135.
62. See id. at 139.
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contemplation" test of National Gypsum or the "conduct" test of
Chateaugay could possibly be used to find that the § 107(a)(4)(B)
claim was discharged or is dischargeable in bankrutpcy. But such an
outcome appears unlikely. A person which did not exist at the time
of a reorganization cannot have fairly contemplated during a
reorganization the incurrence of costs recoverable under §
107(a)(4)(B) against a reorganized debtor. Similarly, it is difficult, if
not impossible, to see how the "conduct" test of Chateaugay could be
used to discharge a § 107(a)(4)(B) claim bought against a reorganized
debtor by a private CERCLA claimant of the sort envisioned during
the oral argument of Atlantic Research. The Second Circuit indicated
as much in Chateaugay when it discussed what sorts of claims could
and could not be recognized and discharged by a bankruptcy and
noted that expecting the Bankruptcy Code to reach all conceivable
claims would lead to "questionable results" 63 which the Court would
not endorse. 64
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Atlantic Research did not imply a private
right of action in § 107(a)(4)(B). Instead, the Court found that a
private right of action exists in "the plain terms of § 107(a)(4)(B)."65
In light of the greater complexity the use of § 107(a)(4)(B) creates for
the discharge of CERCLA claims in a bankruptcy reorganization
after Atlantic Research, it is worth asking if debtors can still hope to
use their reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code to resolve all of
their CERCLA liability for a particular site. The issues presented by
cost recovery under § 107(a)(4)(B) -a cause of action "distinct from
contribution"66 now stand squarely at the intersection of bankruptcy
and environmental law.
Given the myriad private parties that may use § 107(a)(4)(B), the
inability of the existing analytical approaches in bankruptcy to
identify and discharge all of the § 107(a)(4)(B) claims which could
63. In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1003 (2d Cir. 1991).
64. "To expect 'claims' to be filed by those who have not yet had any contact
whatever with the tortfeasor has been characterized as 'absurd."' Id (citing
Schweitzer v. Consol. Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 943 (3d Cir. 1985) (internal
quotations omitted).
65. Atl. Research, 551 U.S. at 141.
66. Id. at 139.
[VOL. XXI
LIABILITY WITHOUT END
be asserted at a given contaminated site, and the fact that it is the
plain language of Congress rather than the judicial implication of the
Supreme Court that created a private cause of action under §
107(a)(4)(B), perhaps the next court to consider the collision of
bankruptcy law with CERCLA should ask if the enactment of §
107(a)(4)(B) on December 11, 1980 added an exception to the scope
of a discharge not expressly enumerated in the Bankruptcy Code. 67 If
this court answers in the affirmative, it would thereby recognize the
enactment of § 107(a)(4)(B) as an implicit repeal of the authority of
the Bankruptcy Code to discharge all of the CERCLA liability a
debtor could have for a particular site. Admittedly, "the only
permissible justification for a repeal by implication exists when
earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable." 68  But if bankruptcy
cases have now grown so complex that the CERCLA liabilities
arising at a particular site cannot be identified and discharged or even
affected by reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code, it is
increasingly difficult to see how CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code
can be reconciled. In short, courts considering the possibilities for
reconciliation of the two statutes after Atlantic Research may find
that the tension which did exist between the Bankruptcy Code and
CERCLA has been resolved in favor of the latter statute.
67. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2006) (enumerating nineteen exceptions to the
scope of a discharge in bankruptcy).
68. J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern. Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 141-
42 (2001) (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974)).
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